Abstract-Link-flooding attack (LFA) has emerged as a serious threat to Internet which cuts off connections between legitimate hosts and targeted servers by flooding only a few links (e.g., target links). Several mechanisms have been proposed to mitigate LFA, however, they can only mitigate LFA passively after target links have been compromised by adversaries. Based on the fact that adversaries rely on network linkmap to launch LFA, in this paper, we propose an active LFA mitigation mechanism, called Linkbait, that actively mitigates LFA by providing a fake linkmap to adversaries. Inspired by Moving Target Defense (MTD), we propose a link obfuscation algorithm in Linkbait that selectively reroutes detecting flows to hide target links from adversaries and mislead them to consider some bait links as target links. By providing the faked linkmap to adversaries, Linkbait can actively mitigate LFA even without identifying bots and does not affect flows from legitimate hosts. In order to further reduce the junk traffic generated by adversaries from entering the network, we propose a bot detection algorithm in Linkbait that extracts unique traffic patterns from LFA and leverages Support Vector Machine to accurately distinguish bots from legitimate hosts. Finally, we evaluate the feasibility of implementing Linkbait in real Internet, and evaluate its performance by using both a real-world testbed and large-scale simulations. The analyses and experiments results demonstrate the effectiveness of Linkbait.
I. INTRODUCTION
Botnet-driven distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, which consumes resources of targeted servers to cause a denial of service (DoS) attack for legitimate hosts, is one of the most serious threats to the Internet because it always leverages legitimate TCP-like flows to launch attacks. A recent example of DDoS attack is that the Mirai botnets brought down much of America's internet in 2016 and was likely the largest of its kind in history [1] . A new type of DDoS attack, called linkflooding attack (LFA), has been proposed recently [2] , [3] , which is even more difficult to be detected or mitigated. Unlike traditional DDoS attacks which mainly consume the resources of the end targets, LFA utilizes distributed botnets to deplete the bandwidth of certain network links (e.g., target links) to disconnect entire domains from the Internet. To be precise, it does not attack the end targets directly, but instead depletes the bandwidth of target links, which makes the detection and defense systems at the end servers irrelevant.
The bots manipulated by an adversary send TCP-like flows to the target area just as legitimate users do. Because of its indirectly attack strategy, the victims may not receive any malicious traffic even they are under attacks. Moreover, it is challenging to distinguish between bots and legitimate hosts because the bots can also use valid IP addresses and the low-rate attack flows from each bot conform to the Internet protocol. With these unique characteristics, LFA has quickly emerged in real-world attacks [4] , [5] , and it is very difficult to be detected or mitigated by traditional defense mechanisms.
LFA has attracted the great attention of researchers and some works recently have been proposed to detect and mitigate it. Xue et al. proposed LinkScope [6] , a detecting system that employs both the end-to-end and the hop-by-hop network measurement techniques to capture abnormal path performance degradation for detecting LFA. Lee et al. proposed Codef [7] , a collaborative defense mechanism between autonomous systems (ASes) to mitigate LFA. However, coordination between ASes or ISPs is not readily available yet due to their competitive relationship and the latency in cooperation. Liaskos et al. proposed a novel framework which implements online traffic engineering (TE) and continuously re-routes traffic in a manner that makes persistent participation to mitigate LFA [8] . Gkounis et al. also investigated the interplay of TE and LFA [9] . Woodpecker [10] proposed a centralized TE scheme based on the upgraded nodes. However, online TE can be an extra burden for the backbone network compared to a mitigation solution. Kang et al. designed an SDN based system, called SPIFFY [11] , that forces the adversary into an untenable tradeoff between cost and detectability for LFA. However, SPIFFY requires to extend bandwidth of the bottlenecked core link in a short time (TBE) which has imposed strong requirements for bandwidth and link infrastructure. Aydeger et al. proposed an SDN based model leveraging TE dynamically to reroute traffic on the suspected target links as long as it is congested [12] . However, adapting frequently changing routing policy for all traffic on core network is not quite feasible, since it fails to consider the network topology condition (such as bandwidth) and impact on benign traffic, and its dependence on SDN makes it inapplicable in realworld network. MoveNet [13] employs virtual networks to offer constant, dynamic and threat-aware reallocation of critical network resources to deceive attackers knowledge about critical network resources, it provides a abstract methodology to counter DDOS, however, it does not continue a detailed discussion about specific DDOS attacks (eg., LFA) with its divergent features taken into consideration. It is also worth noting that all the existing schemes try to passively mitigate the effects of LFA after the target links have been compromised, while none of them can preventively and actively mitigate LFA before it congests the target links. Therefore, it is urgently to design a new mechanism that can actively mitigate LFA without target links being compromised by adversaries.
The adversaries rely on the linkmap of the network to figure out target links and then launch LFA effectively. That is, the core of LFA is to build an accurate linkmap of the network. In order to obtain an accurate linkmap, an adversary will manipulate all his bots to send detecting flows to the network to gather the link information towards as many servers in the target area as possible. However, a legitimate host usually would not gather link information like the adversary does. Thus, we argue that this process becomes an important pattern that can be used to distinguish bots from legitimate hosts. Moreover, if we could mislead the adversary to build a wrong linkmap, LFA will miss fire inevitably.
In this paper, we propose an active link obfuscation mechanism, called Linkbait, to actively mitigate LFA by providing a fake linkmap to adversaries. Inspired by Moving Target Defense (MTD) [14] [15], we propose a link obfuscation algorithm in Linkbait by selectively rerouting detecting flows to obfuscate links, so that target links are hidden from adversaries and some bait links are misjudged as target links by adversaries. Since adversaries rely on the linkmap to discover target links and launch attacks, a fake linkmap will force adversaries to miss fire inevitably. Linkbait uses several bait links to fake target links which could attract attentions from adversaries while hiding the true target links, so that LFA can be avoided in advance without target links being compromised by adversaries. In particular, our bait link construction strategy and selectively flow rerouting policy reduce the probability of bait links being congested by flooding attacks. Furthermore, in order to reduce the junk traffic generated by adversaries from entering the network, we propose a bot detection algorithm that extracts unique traffic patterns from LFA and leverages SVM to accurately distinguish bots from legitimate hosts.
In order to realize our mechanism, there are three major challenges that need to be addressed.
• Link obfuscation: Linkbait intends to hide target links and use bait inks to fake target links. However, numerous flows are randomly distributed in the network. How to distract the attention of the adversary from true target links to bait link is a challenging problem.
• LFA resistance for bait links: Linkbait uses dynamic rerouting to mislead adversaries to build a fake linkmap. The bait links will be exposed to and attacked by the adversary on behalf of target links, which may suffer from congestion and further affect the flows from legitimate hosts. Therefore, how to construct the bait links without suffering congestion in the network is challenging.
• Pre-congestion bot detection: Linkbait tries to detect bots before the links are compromised by the adversary, which is totally different from existing LFA mitigation works detecting bots after the congestion happens. Hence, using only the attack pattern is not sufficient to detect bots. Moreover, it is possible that some legitimate hosts are identified as bots. Therefore, how to achieve an accurate bot detection while minimizing the false positive rate is a challenging problem. We propose Linkbait to solve these challenges, and the main contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
• We propose a novel LFA mitigation mechanism, called Linkbait, to actively mitigate LFA before it congests the network. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to actively mitigate LFA before congestion happens by providing a fake linkmap to adversaries, which is total different from existing works that mitigate LFA passively after the congestion happens in the network.
• We propose a link obfuscation algorithm in Linkbait that selectively reroutes detecting flows to hide target links from adversaries and mislead them to consider some bait links as target links. By providing the faked linkmap to adversaries, Linkbait can actively mitigate LFA without affecting legitimate flows from legitimate hosts.
• We propose a bot detection algorithm which extracts unique traffic features from both the linkmap construction phase and the flooding phase, and leverage SVM to accurately distinguish bots from legitimate hosts.
• We evaluate the performance of Linkbait with implementation in a software defined network (SDN) testbed and large-scale simulations. The experimental results show that Linkbait can effectively mitigate LFA with a very low network latency. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We introduce the system model and the background of LFA in Section II. We present the design of Linkbait in Section III and the security analysis in Section IV. We then evaluate the performance of Linkbait in Section V. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first present the system model, and then introduce the link-flooding attack (LFA) and the moving target defense (MTD) mechanism.
A. System model
In this paper, as shown in Figure 1 , we focus on networks with two edges (ingress routers and egress routers). The networks can be ISPs where servers in the target area are linked with the egress routers to provide services to the public.
Hosts outside the network (on the left side) can access the servers in the target area (on the right side) via the ingress routers. In particular, the legitimate hosts as well as the adversaries can visit the target area by using suitable protocols (e.g., hosts can establish communications with web servers using HTTP). An adversary can manipulate a large number of bots to obtain the linkmap of the network by sending detecting flows to the network. He figures out the target links between the ingress/egress routers, and then launches LFA to the target links in the target area.
B. Link-flooding Attack (LFA)
LFA targets links in the core of the network and creates a large number of attack flows crossing the targeted links to flood and virtually disconnect them [2] , [3] . This kind of attack is quite different from traditional DDoS attacks which aim to deplete the resources of end servers. The adversary first discovers the target links of the network and then manipulates a large number of bots to isolate the targeted victims from the Internet by flooding flows to the target links. LFA consists of two steps: link information gathering and flooding.
Link information gathering: To launch LFA, the adversary will use all his bots to query link information towards as many servers in target area as possible. Usually the adversary leverages network diagnostic tools (e.g., traceroute) to gather layer-3 router links. The link information gathered by the adversary is called linkmap. We call any host which performs such link information querying for legitimate or malicious purpose as a link-prober.
We argue that linkmap is different from network topology [16] . The linkmap consists of all the 2-dimension router information from source hosts to destination servers while the network topology focuses on the infrastructure of 3-dimension router physical connectively relationship. To be precise, the linkmap describes the routing policy towards the target area in the ISP. In order to figure out the best attack-cost strategy, the adversary tends to attack links which can be occupied by as many bots as possible because he can inject more junk traffic to these links. As a consequence, links which can be attacked by enough bots are chosen as target links.
Flooding: In this step, the adversary manipulates a large number of bots to persistently send TCP-like flows to congest the target links by consuming their bandwidth. Note that a rational adversary will cautiously manipulate his bots in a reasonable rate to avoid being detected by the rate-based detecting mechanisms. In addition, the adversary also constantly checks the target links to see whether they are successfully congested.
C. Moving Target Defense (MTD)
The proposed Linkbait in this paper is inspired by the idea of MTD which aims at building a dynamically and continually shifting and changing system to increase the complexity and cost for an adversary instead of simply cutting off the adversary's connection. By sending illegible fake information to potential threateners, MTD forces them to spend more time and cost so that they will leave more footprints, making them easier to be exposed. Please refer to [14] and [15] for more details of MTD.
III. LINKBAIT DESIGN
In this paper, we propose a new mechanism, called Linkbait, to actively mitigate LFA with active link obfuscation. The key idea of Linkbait is to provide an obfuscated linkmap to the adversary by using selectively flow rerouting, and mislead attacks from bots to the faked target links while hiding the true target links. Different from existing LFA mitigation mechanisms, Linkbait is an active attack mitigation mechanism that can actively mitigate LFA before it congests the network.
In this section, we first give a high-level overview of Linkbait, and then elaborate on the design of Linkbait.
A. Linkbait Overview
As shown in Figure 2 , Linkbait consists of three components: link sifting, link obfuscation and bot detection. In link sifting, we check the flow distribution of all links in the network to figure out the target links that may be flooded by bots and also select appropriate links as bait links to fake target links. Link obfuscation tries to provide a fake linkmap for the adversary by selectively rerouting of detecting flows, so that the true target links are hidden while the bait links will be misjudged as target links and attacked by the adversary. It is worth noting that a bait link contains multiple links which can efficiently mitigate LFA to the bait link. Although LFA can be mitigated by link obfuscation, we further leverage a supervised learning algorithm to accurately distinguish bots from legitimate hosts, and certain measures can be taken to reduce the junk traffic going through the network.
In this paper, we use software defined network (SDN) to implement Linkbait due to its favorable features of centralized control and network programmability. However, we need to particularly point out that SDN is just one convenient way to implement our mechanism, and Linkbait can also be implemented in traditional networks.
B. Link Sifting
Link sifting 1 aims to figure out potential target links of the network and select appropriate links to fake target links. We call the faked target link as bait links. To realize this purpose, link sifting has two phases: link analysis and link grouping. The former tries to obtain the whole network information including all the links and their flow densities, and the latter figures out the target links and select appropriate links to form bait links.
1) Link Analysis:
In this paper, we deem that a single link is a stable router sequence from an ingress router to an egress router, which serves as a communication channel between hosts and servers in the target area. We propose two methods to obtain the whole network information.
The first method is called looking glass tracing (LG tracing), which leverages existing network diagnostic tools (e.g., traceroute) to collect link information. In order to obtain the complete link information in the network, the ISP needs to hire a large number of hosts distributed in different locations to trace links, which is expensive and impossible for a single ISP due to its limited resources. Fortunately, there are many public available servers maintained by other ISPs providing traceroute services. We call these servers as LG servers and they can be remotely accessed for the purpose of querying routing information. These servers are distributed around the world, which are similar to the distribution of bots. Therefore, with the help of LG servers, LG tracing leverages existing network diagnostic tools to collect link information of the ISP [17] . As the adversary also uses existing network diagnostic tools to obtain target links, the links we obtain can cover the links obtained by the adversary as long as the number of LG servers manipulated by the ISP is large enough.
The second method is called statical routing table computation (SRTC). We look up all the routing tables in routers between the ingress and egress routers, based on which we then compute every link to the target area.
LG tracing is more suitable for large-scale networks, while SRTC can be applied to small-scale networks to obtain more accurate link information. Flow density represents bandwidth utilization for links. According to the universal power-law property of flow density distribution [3] , the more flows can be created through one link, the higher flow density it has. Thus, we estimate the flow density of a link by calculating the number of LG servers going through the link.
2) Link Grouping: After gathering the link information, we can compute the flow density of each link and then figure out which links are most likely to be flooded. In this paper, we use the algorithm in [3] to figure out the target links.
In order to hide the true target links from the adversary, we select some links to fake target links and reroute the detecting flows of bots to these faked links. We call these faked links as bait links. As a consequence, the adversary will obtain a fake linkmap and misjudge the bait links as the target links. Note that a bait link in our mechanism is not a single link but is composed of several links. There are two reasons to construct a bait link in this way. First, in order to fake a target link, it should have large flow density after flow rerouting. The most convenient way to realize this purpose is to reroute the detecting flows of multiple links to one converge link. Second, the bait links will suffer from flooding attacks from bots. The congestion can be reduced if the attacks are distributed into multiple links of each bait link.
We argue that increasing flow density of bait links is necessary to attract more bots to misjudge them as target links. Hence, we propose two principles to select links to construct a bait link. First, the links of a bait link can be chosen from several normal links which support a certain amount of traffic instead of links with very low flow density. Second, partial flows to true target links can also be rerouted to bait links in order to increase their detecting flows.
C. Linkmap Obfuscation
The adversary manipulates a large number of bots to create detecting flows to the network to obtain the linkmap. Linkmap obfuscation is proposed to provide a fake linkmap to the adversary and use several bait links to fake target links. To realize this purpose, link obfuscation is proposed with two steps: link-prober identification and selectively flow rerouting. It is worth noting that a link-prober can be a bot or a legitimate host since a legitimate host may also create detecting flows to the network just like a bot does. Therefore, the linkmap obfuscation should not affect the objective of legitimate hosts.
1) Link-prober Identification:
This step aims to identify all the link-probers and label their detecting flows for the rerouting purpose. As we mentioned earlier, a link-prober can use network diagnostic tools to create detecting flows to query the IP information of every hop. In particular, we focus on identifying the traffic generated by traceroute since it is one of the most widely used network diagnostic tools used by both adversaries and the legitimate hosts (e.g., [18] also uses traffic of traceroute to detect links attacked by LFA). It is worth noting that the framework of link-prober also works for other network diagnostic tools due to their similar traffic patterns.
All the flows enter the network via the ingress routers, so we can implement a real-time monitoring on the ingress traffic to identify the detecting flows. However, frequent operations on the ingress routers will introduce heavy burden to them and increase network latency, so we separate the flows towards the target area from numerous traffic and mirror them into a SPAN switch. In this paper, we leverage the SDN controller to analyze the mirrored traffic instead of performing this work on the ingress routers. The controller will examine all the flows through the SPAN switch and identify the detecting flows according to the unique features of traceroute.
The detecting flows generated by traceroute have two unique features: repeated invalid destination port and Different TTL from the same source, which can help us to distinguish the detecting flows from other TCP-like flows. Traceroute leverages ICMP Time Exceeded message responded from routers to discover IP-level nodes along router paths. Hence, it continuously sends packets with different TTL value. In addition, traceroute must choose the destination UDP port number to be an unlikely value (e.g., >30,000), making it improbable that an application at the destination is using that port [19] . When traceroute receives a 'port unreachable', it knows its task has finished.
Bots that sends a sequence of packets containing different TTL and invalid dest ports, to collect link information toward the target area, differ a lot from those legitimate hosts. Since the links to transform traffic from specific areas are always stable (or several hops fluctuation), traffic from normal users (not link-probers) always arrive the ingress of ISP with a comparatively stable TTL as well as a valid dest port, while traffic from link-probers must carry different TTL as well as invalid dest ports. With these two unique features, we can distinguish the detecting flows from other flows, and the hosts creating detecting flows will be identified as link-probers. Even if the adversary perceives the existence of Linkbait and mutate his probe traffic (e.g., randomizing TTL or prolonging the interval between each packet) to evade from identification, Linkbait can still pick out these probers. This situation will be discussed in Section IV.
After identifying the link-probers, flow tables are installed on the ingress routers to label detecting flows of link-probers in a real-time manner. Note that only detecting flows of linkprobers are labeled while TCP-like flows of link-probers are not modified. These labeled detecting flows will be recognized and rerouted in the next step.
2) Selectively Flow Rerouting: In order to provide a fake linkmap to the adversary, we propose a selectively flow rerouting policy to reroute detecting flows accordingly. The basic idea is to reduce detecting flows to the target links and increase detecting flows to the bait links, so that the bait links will be misjudged as target links by the adversary. We emphasize that only detecting flows will be rerouted while other TCP-like flows from the link-probers or other hosts will not be labeled or rerouted. In particular, we have different rerouting policies for detecting flows to the target links and the bait links respectively.
Rerouting policy for detecting flows to the target link: The true target links are obtained by Linkbait in link sifting. We would like to reroute the detecting flows to the target links to other links randomly, so that the adversary cannot figure out the true target links. In order to hide the target links from the adversary, we associate a set of links to each target link, which are called branch links. The branch links can be any links in the network which should have small communication latency with the target link. For each detecting flow to the target link, as shown in Figure 3 , it will be randomly rerouted to one of the branch links of the target link. This random rerouting policy reduces the flow density to each target link, and makes the link information changes dynamically to link-probers so they cannot figure out the true target links.
Rerouting policy for detecting flows to the bait link: We intend to use bait links to fake target links, so that the adversary will be misled. In our mechanism, a bait link is not a single link, but contains several links. In order to fake a target link, for the links in a bait link, the one with the largest bandwidth will be selected as the converge link. As shown in Figure 4 , for any detecting flow to the links of a bait link, it will be rerouted to the coverage link of the bait link. This will increase the flow density of the coverage link and mislead the judgement of the adversary. Figure 5 illustrates how the detecting flows from the bots of the adversary to the target area are selectively rerouted. According to the rerouting policy, only the detecting flows (denoted by the red dashed) through the target link will be randomly distributed to its branch links, and the detecting flows through the links of a bait link will be converged to its converge link, while the TCP-like flows (denoted by black lines) still go through their original links without any rerouting. Note that branch links of a target link can belong to a bait link.
This selectively flow rerouting has several advantages. First, the true target links will be hidden and protected. Second, the bait links will be misjudged as target links by the adversary. Moreover, when the adversary launch attacks to the bait links with TCP-like flows, these flows will not be rerouted and still go through their original links. As a consequence, neither the true target links nor the bait links will be congested by the adversary, so that LFA becomes useless.
We emphasize that only detecting flows will be rerouted while other flows from the link-probers will not be labeled or rerouted. If we rerouted all the flows, although the true target links is hidden from the adversary, the converge link of each bait link will be congested by LFA. It is also worth noting that legitimate hosts will not be influenced by selectively flow rerouting. The objective of legitimate hosts is to testify the router-level connectivity, which is different from the objectives of the adversary who wants to obtain the linkmap and the target links. Since selectively flow rerouting only modifies partial hops in a link, traceroute with legitimate purpose can still obtain a valid result.
Linkmap Obfuscation component plays the role of monitor and injector in the network. In this paper, we leverage Differentiated Services Code Point(DSCP) [20] which can be agilely adapted into traditional network and disturbs the legitimate users as little as possible to deploy Linkmap Obfuscation componentection (Please refer to Section IV-B for the details). During the link-prober identification stage, DSCP is introduced to label the detecting flows. The detecting flows, marked as a special services in DSCP by ingress routers, will be transmitted by normal routers in ISP, while flows with the special label, will be discriminated by the router in bait links and target links. As a consequence, these links can redirect detecting flows according to different policies. Hence, once detecting flows enter bait link or target link, it will be redirected so as to obfuscate routes. Note that the DSCP method is only one of various solutions to deploy Linkbait, it can be altered according to the requirement and situation of individual ISP itself.
D. Bot detection
Different from exiting LFA mitigation mechanisms, Linkbait can actively mitigate LFA by link obfuscation even without the effort of bot detection. However, the network still suffers from junk traffic generated by the bots. In this section, we further propose the bot detection component to accurately distinguish bots from legitimate hosts. It is worth noting that bot detection of Linkbait is different from that of existing schemes. Since we issue early warning about suspicious bots before links are congested, we can leverage routing policies (e.g., TE) to regulate their flows instead of simply preventing them from entering our network. In this way, these legitimate hosts who are identified as malicious bots by Linkbait will not be severely disturbed.
The biggest difference between bots and legitimate linkprobers is that the former tries to dig out as many links as possible while the latter only queries one or two links at one time. Generally speaking, an adversary spends a relatively long time to construct the linkmap since the detecting flows were gradually generated by a large number of bots. Once the linkmap is obtained, the adversary will fully utilizes all his bots to flood the target links with TCP-like flows. With our link obfuscation, the adversary will converge his junk flows into bait links at the same time. In this paper, we propose to leverage the unique patterns during the linkmap construction phase and the flooding phase to accurately distinguish bots from legitimate hosts. In particular, we monitor the long-term traceroute traffic and also continuously monitor the shortterm flooding traffic with a sliding window. By combining these features, we leverage a supervised learning algorithm to accurately distinguish bots from legitimate hosts.
1) Feature extraction:
We extract two features corresponding to the unique traffic patterns of the bots during the flooding phase and the linkmap construction phase. The first feature is called flooding matrix, which represents the short-term flooding traffic patterns of a link-prober. The second feature is called traceroute matrix, which represents the long-term traffic patterns for linkmap construction of a link-prober. It is noting that the flooding matrix is the main feature that we extract and the traceroute matrix, which aims at improving detection accuracy, is just an optional choice for Linkbait. Flooding Matrix (FM): Once the linkmap is obtained, the adversary will fully utilize all its bots to flood the target links with TCP-like flows. FM represents the flooding behaviors of a host which accesses links during the flooding phase. However, it is unknown to us when the adversary will launch the flooding attacks. To solve this problem, we use a sliding window to continuously detect the flooding behaviors. Note that any host is suspected of being a bot even if it is not a link-prober, hence every host which accesses links should have FMs.
A sliding window consists of n intervals and the sliding windows moves with one interval each time. Let I i denote the ith interval of a sliding window. We use f s ij to represent the traffic, denoted by the number of bytes, going through link i during I j . The FM for a host i during a sliding window can be represented as follows.
As the sliding windows moves, we can obtain a lot of FMs for each host. Traceroute Matrix (TM): TM represents the traceroute behaviors of a link-prober during a detection period DT whereas DT is divided into multiple subperiods. Let T i denote the ith subperiod of DT . For each link-prober, we use f t ij to represent the traceroute frequency of the link-prober towards link i during T j .
Suppose there are m links and n subperiods. Thus, the TM for a host i is represented as follows.
Therefore, each link-prober has a TM to represent the traffic pattern during the detection period of DT . The value of DT depends on how much time spent by the adversary to construct the linkmap, which varies from an adversary to another. Generally speaking, link distribution dynamically changes due to load-balancing, so the adversary will launch LFA immediately after linkmap construction. We set DT to be 5 days since adversaries usually take less than 5 days to obtain the linkmap. Note that DT cannot be too large or too small. If DT is too small, we cannot discover the traceroute behaviors of all bots manipulated by the adversary since it gradually uses bots to obtain the linkmap. While if DT is too large, too much efforts are wasted for monitoring the large traffic in the network.
2) Classification: With the extracted features, we then leverage a supervised classification algorithm to distinguish bots from legitimate hosts. Each link-prober has one TM and many FMs while other hosts only have FMs. In particular, we combine all FMs together to form the joint-FM for each host. In our experiments, we collect a ground truth dataset where each sample has a label to indicate the corresponding host is a bot or a legitimate user (e.g., 0 indicates a bot and 1 indicates a legitimate user). We divide the ground truth dataset into a training set and a testing set. The training set is used to train a supervised classifier which then predicts the label of each sample in the testing set. The classification accuracy can be calculated by comparing the predicted labels of samples in the testing set with their true labels. In particular, a linear multiclass Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier implemented by libSVM3 [21] is employed for accurate classification.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we first analyze why the adversary cannot congest the network under Linkbait, and then discuss the feasibility of identifying the link-probers.
A. Adversary's Encounter with Linkbait
The adversary aims at disjointing connections between the target area and Internet, so it tends to congest as many links as possible by using a limited number of bots. Suppose each bot has an upstream bandwidth U and the adversary can manipulate N b bots to launch attacks.
LFA without Linkbait: To saturate a target link with bandwidth B, the adversary utilizes N p = B/U bots whose flows can go through the target link. Using N p bots guarantees a robust congestion even if there is no legitimate flows in the link. Since the adversary possesses N b bots, it can flood N ideal = N b /N p links towards the target area under ideal conditions. We consider this as an ideal condition because not every bot can be fully utilized in common situations. Some bots are not able to congest target links chosen by the adversary, so that they keep unused in the attack. Let us denote the amount of these unused bots as N un (N un ≪ N p ). Thus, the adversary can only use N bot − N un to finish the attack.
LFA with Linkbait: Linkbait hides the true target links and misleads the attacks of the adversary to the bait links. Since the target links are hidden from the adversary, so they would not be attacked or congested. In our experiments, as shown in Table I , we found that almost all the traffic to the target area go through the limited number of target links. In other words, once the target links are protected, the traffic to the the target area would not be congested.
Let us then consider the attack to the bait links. Suppose a bait link consists of M normal links. When the adversary created TCP-like flows to congest the bait link, the flows will be distributed to M links for each bait link. Let α i B denote the bandwidth of the i link of a bait link. In order to congest the bait link, the adversary is supposed to use N l bots which is calculated as follows.
That is, the number of bots required to flood a bait link is
We can observe that if α i = 1, the attack cost of the adversary has been forced to increase from N p to M N p . Moreover, the more number of links to form a bait link, the higher the attack cost is required for the adversary.
B. Real-world feasibility with Linkbait
Feasibility of real-world implementation is critical when we consider whether a system is technical correct for a large scale oriented network. Therefore, we should propose an efficient implementation which can be agilely adapted into traditional network and disturbs the legitimate users as little as possible.
For the simplicity of implementation, employing DSCP to build Linkbait has the following advantages. First, DSCP has been widely supported by most vendors (e.g., Cisco [22] and Huawei [23]), so Linkbait based on DSCP is compatible with current hardwares. Second, given that DSCP has been employed by ISP for many purpose, such as load-balancing, reconfiguring DSCP to adapt Linkbait requires no more effort than simply adding one rule even in large scale networks, which reduces the burden of deployment and maintenance. Third, the logical structure of Linkmap Obfuscation component, which consists of an ingress monitor and distributed obfuscation injectors, can be rendered by DSCP perfectly.
For the little disturbances on legitimate users, there are two situations to consider. When network failures happen outside the obfuscation areas, traceroute with legitimate purpose (e.g., network diagnosis) can still obtain a valid result and thus figure out the node of failures. Because selectively flow rerouting only modifies partial hops which only distribute in obfuscation areas. Once fail nodes are from obfuscation areas, various recovering mechanisms are provided by DSCP can agilely handle the failures so as to fast recover its network usability.
C. Versatility of link-prober identification
In Linkbait, we identify a host as a link-prober if he repeatedly creates flows to reach every hop of a link. The identification is feasible because the fact that a link-prober can only fetch informations of one hop in a link every time he requests if he wants to obtain link information towards the target area.
As we have mentioned, the adversary uses network diagnostic tools to collect link information of the network. The most significant characteristic of these tools is that it probes only one hop every time. This is due to the intrinsical nature of Internet routing protocols that packets will be informed the next hop only after reaching a router. Since a link-prober has no idea where his packet will be directed, he must query hops in the link repeatedly using tools like traceroute. Hence, the detecting flows reveal the same feature no matter which network diagnostic tools are used.
And in addition to that, it is the complicated hop discovering patterns, which the adversary must perform, that relief the realtime reacting requirement for Linkbait. Since the adversary requires a comparatively long time to discover an entire link. Linkbait has enough time to perform traffic analysis and identify the probers before real links are disclosed.
D. Effectiveness against adversaries perceiving Linkbait
In most situations, adversaries perform link-probe stage in a comparatively constant period. However, once the adversary perceives the existence of Linkbait, he might well launch link-probe in a very flexible way so as to evade from the sliding windows based detection. In this paper, We claim three mutation methods and discuss the effectiveness of Linkbait against them.
Prolonging interval between each link-probe: An adversary might probe links in a very long time interval by large number of bots. Once a bot can send intermittent probes in long time period and escape from the detection window, Linkbait seems to be unable to detect these bots. However, it is not the case.
Firstly, we combine two features to perform fine-grain bot detection. Even TM can be annul by the adversaries' countermeasure, FM which reflects the short-time flooding pattern during the flooding stage of the adversary will still remain effective, since the adversary must launch attacks by all his bots at the same time in order to deplete the bandwidth. In the absence of TM generated by traceroute, the detection accuracy can still be satisfying, which possesses a bot detection rate higher than 86%. The probe feature , which aims at improving detection accuracy, is just an optional choice for Linkbait. Therefore, Linkbait's effectiveness will not be diminished without it. As we have mentioned in Bot detection, Linkbait can actively mitigate LFA by link obfuscation even without the effort of bot detection. Even though bots might escape from detection windows, they still get deceived. The Flooding towards a bait will encounter no more than stable transmission. Secondly, the linkmap accuracy of long-term probing suffers from inevitably periodic link changes in ISP, which diminishes the adversaries' threat.
Randomizing packet headers for each packet: The attacker can also randomize header of packets to evade from link-prober identification. But it is in vain due to the fundamental differences between the link-probe of bots and normal access. By repeatedly sending the same TTL from one bot, the adversary seems to mask the fact that his bots carry changing TTL. However, it exacerbates the other feature, the invalid ports. Hence, Linkbait can still find out the bots.
One in all link-probe: It is common for a adversary to compromise a large network and manipulate all its hosts. Since these bots share the same or nearby IP segments, they also share similar links towards target area. Hence it is feasible for the adversary to reduce the risk of being captured by reducing the number of bots performing link-probe. He can just employ partial bots in the network instead of all to perform link-probe and then launch the attack with all bots. In this way, the bots which do not perform link-probe do escape from the linkprober identification. However, once the bots which perform link-probe are identified, the whole IP segment can be marked as suspected. Linkbait can still identify the suspected bots which belong to these IP segment during the flooding. When these bots try to compromise the bait links, restrains can be imposed on them so as to remove these junk traffic out of our network.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of Linkbait by using both real-world experiments and large-scale simulations. In particular, we first implement link sifting in real-world networks to show the feasibility of deploying Linkbait in a real ISP. We then implement a prototype on a real SDN testbed to see whether Linkbait can obfuscate the linkmap while maintaining a low network latency. Finally, we simulate large-scale LFA and evaluate the accuracy of bot detection with large-scale simulations. 
A. Internet-scale Link Sifting
Bait links are the key to the success of Linkbait, which can fake target links and selectively reroute flows. Therefore, we implement link sifting in real-world Internet to see whether we can find enough bait links to attract the attention of the adversary.
We choose five places as the target areas in Internet. In particular, five ASes scattering in the United States are chosen in our experiments. We leverage 126 LG servers provided by Telia [24] and Cogentco [25] to launch LG tracing. Both of them provide web interfaces for users to run traceroute. As seen in Figure 6 , these LG servers are globally distributed in 33 countries, and 68 of these servers are provided by Telia while 58 are provided by Cogentco. By using globally distributed LG servers we could find as many paths as possible whose destinations are the ASes we choose.
1) Basic link information:
The basic link information of the five ASes are collected using LG tracing, and the detailed information for each AS is shown in Table I . The Avg Hop Num represents the average number of hops in all paths towards each AS. The Non-identical Path represents the number of different links from all LG servers to each AS. The flow density of a link is estimated by the times it appears in the results of traceroute of all the LG servers. The Coverage of Top-15 flow-density links is the fraction of the number of LG servers which can access the top 15 highest flow density links to the total number of LG servers. It can be used to estimate the flow distribution of the network. As seen in Table I , the coverage for AS1, AS3 and AS4 reach 100% because almost all paths from different LG servers to each AS share the same link at the end servers, making the coverage 100%. The network size can be seen from the non-identical paths. We observe that AS4 has the least number of paths whereas AS2 has the most, which indicates that AS3 is the smallest network whereas AS2 is the largest. In this way, we can guarantee that our algorithm works for various network topologies.
2) Traceroute time cost: To investigate the relationship between link latency and the scale of ASes, we show the time spent of every single hop for each AS during traceroute in Figure 7 . We can see that the longest time spent for one hop is 6.14s due to network latency, whereas the lowest is 0.076s. The average time spent for discovering one node of all 5 ASes is 1.72s. Combining with Table I , we observe that networks with more number of non-identical paths have a longer average time cost on every hop. This is because more number of nonidentical paths leads to a more complex and larger network, which possesses a comparatively long geographical distance and therefore a large latency.
3) Link coverage:
As we mentioned, link sifting tries to hide the target links and find as many bait links as possible to obfuscate target links. Link coverage here is estimated by the fraction of the number of LG servers which can be obfuscate by bait links to the total number of LG servers. The higher the link coverage, the better obfuscation the network.
In our experiments, we measure the link coverage for the 5 ASes. Since we cannot obtain the actual bandwidth or the flow density of links in ISP, we use Round-Trip Time (RTT) to estimate them. In addition, we prefer to combine links whose hops share both the same class A address and class B address, because these hops usually appear to be inside one intranet, and combining these links could minimize the delay of rerouting. Let N L th denotes the required minimum number of links to form a bait link. Figure 8 shows the link coverage against the variation of N L th . We can see that the link coverage decreases as N L th increases, which is because less links in the network are chosen to form bait links. However, almost for all ASes, the link coverage can reach 70% when N L th ≤ 4. The only exception is AS4 which mainly because its small-scale network has limited number of links for sifting. Based on these observations, we argue that link sifting can realize a satisfying linkmap obfuscation with an appropriate N L th that covers most of the flows towards the target area.
B. Evaluation using Real Testbed
We then implement Linkbait in a real testbed to evaluate its performance. In particular, we focus on the rerouting latency introduced by Linkbait since our mechanism should not affect legitimate hosts or be perceived by the adversary. Therefore, the lower latency introduced by Linkbait, the better link obfuscation to the adversaries. Thus, we build a simple ISP on a real testbed to evaluate the rerouting latency. 1) Prototype Implementation: We implement the DSCP based network prototype over physical nodes and links provided by Cloudlab [26] . Cloudlab provides physical machines across three sites around the United States: Utah, Wisconsin, and South Carolina. It also provides 2 × 10Gbps network interfaces to every node via SDN. It is worth noting that SDN is not the prerequisite of Linkbait implementation, since the DSCP method, as discussed above, can be deployed in traditional networks as well. We implement Linkbait on the Floodlight [27] controller. We use OVS [28] to virtualize layer-2 switches which support OpenFlow 1.3 [29] to perform selectively rerouting. Note that links in our experiments consist of layer-3 routers whereas only rerouting sites are implemented as switches. In addition, we leverage iPerf [30] to emulate the legitimate TCP-like flows in the network.
We build a simple ISP network with two edges (ingress/egress routers) in the prototype. A bait link with three parallel links is deployed between the edges. Among the three link, there is a converge link L c for link obfuscation, and there is another link L o through which both link-probers and legitimate users communicate with the target area. In addition, there is a link L l which only contains legitimates flows. It is worth noting that the effect of flow rerouting can be demonstrated even with only one bait link, since rerouting in a large system just uses a combination of several bait links.
2) Rerouting Latency: The Rerouting latency is an important metric for evaluating the performance of Linkbait. On one hand, the network jitter caused by rerouting should not disturb legitimate hosts. On the other hand, since latency may produce a deviation for the result of link-probers (traceroute), we should reduce this jitter in case the adversary perceives that the linkmap has been faked.
Rerouting Impact on legitimate hosts. To investigate the impact on legitimate hosts, we measure Round-Trip Time (RTT) during three different stages in Linkbait. Figure 9 illustrates the RTT change for legitimate hosts. The link L o supports all link-probers' traffic before 11.6s. Our mechanism identifies and reacts immediately after a link-prober performs traceroute at 11.6s. The response time includes the time for link-prober identification and the time for pushing corresponding labeling flow table to Openflow-enabled switches. As shown in Figure 9 , legitimate hosts who communicate with the target area via L o experience a temporary block. However, RTT quickly returns to a normal value when Linkbait handles traceroute of the link-prober.
Rerouting Impact on Link-probers. To investigate the impact on link-probers, we record the result of traceroute during rerouting policy takes effect. Figure 10 demonstrates an example of traceroute to wikipedia.org. When traceroute runs, traceroute outputs the list of traversed routers in a simple text format, together with the timing information. With the list of routers, a link-prober restores a link. In addition, the linkprober can observe whether every hop works fine according to its traceroute delay. An abnormal delay may alert the adversary, which leads to a failed obfuscation. Figure 11 shows the timing information for traceroute command with and without our rerouting policy. We create detecting flows every 7ms to the network. Each black line shows the timing information for each hop of a detecting flow with the rerouting policy. Each gray line shows the timing information for each hop of a detecting flow without rerouting policy, which is considered as a baseline.
From Figure 11 , we observe that detecting flows experience an inevitable temporary block around the second hop when Linkbait starts to reroute its flow to L c . This is because the rerouting operation occurs at that hop. We also observe that the latency of the following hops drops quickly, which indicates that our rerouting policy only blocks several hops rather than the whole link. Hence, Linkbait achieves a robust flow rerouting from L o to L c . We also observe that time spent for querying every hop with the rerouting policy only slightly differs from that of baselines. The average time spent for every hop is 1.32ms whereas that of baselines is 1.24ms. As a consequence, Linkbait seamlessly obfuscates a linkmap before adversaries obtain the real one. In this experiment, we evaluate the effect of Linkbait on network delay over physical nodes. Our system generates a short delay to identify traceroute and deploy rerouting policy before network delay backs to normal.
C. Evaluation using Large-scale Simulation
In this section, we further evaluate the performance of bot detection of Linkbait by using large-scale simulations. We use the real link information collected from the real-world Internet in Section V-A in the experiments of simulations. We deploy 100 bots, 190 legitimate hosts and 20 servers in the target area. The legitimate hosts send packets to servers at different rates in order to get services from them. The bots send flooding flows to launch LFA to the servers.
In Linkbait, we extract the FM and TM features and use SVM to distinguish bots from legitimate hosts. The evaluation mainly focus on the following metrics. (1) bot detection rate: the ratio of the number of identified bots to the total number of bots; (2) false-positive rate: the ratio of the number of legitimate hosts wrongly identified as bots to the total number of legitimate hosts. We expect that the bot detection rate should be as high as possible while the false-positive rate should be as low as possible. Performance vs. Data used for training: We first evaluate the performance against the percentage of data used for training. Figure 12 shows the bot detection performance against the percentage of joint-FM features or fused FM-TM features used for training. The bot detection rate increases and the false-positive rate decreases as the percentage of data used for training increases. This is because the SVM classifier is more accurate with larger amount of training data. We can also observe that the bot detection rate using fused features is better than using only joint-FM features under the same parameters. The false-positive rate using fused features is lower than using only joint-FM features under the same parameters. Therefore, it is better to combine joint-FM and TM together to accurately distinguish bots from legitimate hosts. When 80% data are used for training, the bot detection rate can reach 88.5% while the false-positive rate drops under 7.5%. Performance vs. Confidence Threshold CT svm : The label of a new sample predicted by SVM classifier is attached with a confidence score which indicates the confidence level of predicting the sample as that category. We only treat the predicted bots as real bots when the confidence score of predicted bots is larger than a Confidence Threshold CT svm . Figure 13 shows the impact of confidence threshold on the performance of bot detection when 70% data are used for training. We can see that both the bot detection rate and the false-positive rate decrease as the confidence threshold increases. This is because more low-confidence bots judgements are refused when CT svm is higher. As a result, less legitimate hosts are wrongly identified as bots and suspected bots are more likely to slip away. We can also observe that using TM and FM features together can achieves better performance than using joint-FM features only. When CT svm is 0.6, the false-positive rate is near 5% while the bot detection rate is still above 80%. It is noting that the detection accuracy can still be satisfying even without TM features.
D. Comparison with Existing Schemes
In this section, we compare Linkbait with the state-of-theart of LFA mitigating schemes (e.g., Spiffy [11] , CoDef [7] and Liaskos [8] ). Table II shows their comparisons from five aspects. All the other three mechanisms are based on TE while Linkbait is inspired by MTD and uses link obfuscation to mitigate the effects of LFA. Linkbait only reroutes the detecting flows, and the normal TCP flows will not be affected while the other three mechanisms affect all the traffic flows. Time to take effect tells us when the system starts to handle LFA. As a matter of fact, the earlier the system reacts, the little congestion the network will suffer. In particular, Linkbait uses link obfuscation to mitigate LFA before the attacks congest the links while the other mechanisms take effect when the attacks already happen. Also, Linkbait can be implemented by one single ISP without no collaboration with other ISPs, which reduces the cost and complexity. Therefore, we can conclude that Linkbait can actively mitigate LFA before the the network is congested without affecting legitimate flows, and has low implementation cost and high bot detection rate.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose Linkbait to actively mitigate LFA by providing a fake linkmap to the adversary. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to actively mitigate LFA before congestion happens, which is total different from existing works that mitigate LFA passively after the links are comprised by adversaries. The core of Linkbait is link obfuscation that selectively reroutes detecting flows to hide target links from adversaries and mislead them to consider bait links as target links. Furthermore, we extract unique traffic features from both the linkmap construction phase and the flooding phase, and leverage SVM to accurately distinguish bots from legitimate hosts. The experiments with real-world testbed and large-scale simulations demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of Linkbait. The experimental results show that Linkbait introduces a very small rerouting latency and achieves a high bot detection rate while maintaining a low false positive rate.
